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ABSTRACT 
Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, 
the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several 
decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson 
Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell 
AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been 'word of 
mouth.'
The root causes and consequences of the incidents vary drastically; however, certain 'themes' 
can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common 'themes" 
are summarized below: 
• Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can 
lead to being falsely comfortable with a system 
• Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or 
hardware is damaged 
• Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure 
• Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger 
• Improper personal protective equipment (PPE), spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing 
equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs 
• Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental 
and quickly lead to an undesirable incident 
• Improper materials cleanliness or compatibility and chemical reactivity can result in fires or 
explosions 
• Improper established 'back-out' and/or emergency safing procedures can escalate an event 
The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to 
handling hypergolic fluids or processing vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Hypergolic fluids are toxic liquids that react spontaneously and violently when they contact each 
other. These fluids are used in many different rocket and aircraft systems for propulsion and hydraulic 
power including, orbiting satellites, manned spacecraft, military aircraft, and deep space probes. 
Hypergolic fuels include hydrazine (N 2H4) and its derivatives including monomethyihydrazine (MMH), 
unsymmetrical di-methyihydrazine (UDMH), and Aerozine 50 (A-50), which is an equal mixture of N2H4 
and UDMH. The oxidizer used with these fuels is usually nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), also known as 
dinitrogen tetroxide or NTO, and various blends of N 2O4 with nitric oxide (NO). 
Several documented, unintentional hypergolic fluid spills and fires related to the Apollo Program, 
the Space Shuttle Program, and several other programs from approximately 1968 through the spring of 
2009 have been studied for the primary purpose of extracting the lessons learned. Spill sites include 
KSC, JSC, WSTF, CCAFS, EAFB, McConnell AFB, and VAFB. 
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PROPERTIES OF NITROGEN TETROXIDE (N,04) 
Nitrogen tetroxide is a strong oxidizing agent that is used with the hydrazine family of fuels for 
rocket propulsion in the vacuum of space. It was accepted as the rocket propellant oxidizer of choice in 
the early 1950's by the U.S.S.R. and the United States. N 204 itself is nonflammable, non-explosive, and 
does not exothermically decompose; however, when added to a fire it will increase the intensity of 
combustion and burning rate by providing an additional oxygen source to the air. 22 N2O4 is highly 
corrosive and extremely toxic. N 204 is a liquid in equilibrium with nitrogen dioxide (NO 2) vapor: N2O4 
(liquid) -+ 2NO (vapor). This equilibrium favors the vapor with increasing temperature and/or decreasing 
pressure. This is reversible when the conditions are the opposite. N 204 is available in various "grades" 
ranging from pure N 204
 to 25% NO. 
When N 204 liquid or NO2
 vapors come in contact with skin, eyes, or the respiratory system, the 
oxides of nitrogen react with water to produce nitric (HNO 3) and nitrous (HONO) acids that typically 
destroy tissue. Together, these compounds oxidize the moist and flexible inner tissue of the alveoli sacs 
within the lungs when inhaled. The alveoli sacs are the location in which the oxygen and carbon dioxide 
exchange takes place that is necessary for respiration. Adequate exposure will cause these affected 
areas oxidative stress and cellular death. The pulmonary capillaries are the next to die. When this 
occurs, the plasma diffuses through the vessel walls in the lungs, resulting in a build-up of fluid (edema). 
Since the fluid accumulation results from pulmonary vessel failure, the effect and symptoms may not be 
immediate. However, at high enough concentrations, immediate death from hypoxia could occur as a 
result of airway spasm, oxygen displacement, or reflex respiratory arrest. Delayed death could occur as a 
result of significant fluid build-up leading to respiratory failure. In non-mortal exposure cases, tissue may 
heal with scarring (in the location where the tissue was significantly exposed), leading to bronchiolitis 
obliterans (destruction of the small airways and air sacs). Survivors may have varying degrees of 
permanent restrictive lung disease with pulmonary fibrosis.58 
N204 (NO2) vapors are approximately three times heavier than air and liquid N 204 evaporates 
about five times faster than water at room temperature. 22
 The vapors of MON-3 are normally reddish-
brown in color, which is caused by rapid vaporization of NO 2. Liquid N204 and its vapors will explode on 
contact with hydrazine fuels, amines, and alcohol. Ignition may also occur when N 204 comes into contact 
with wood, paper, hydrocarbon fuels, and some adhesives. A mixture of N 204 and halogenated solvents: 
carbon tetrachloride, TCE, erchloroethyIene, etc., may produce a violent explosion. 22 MON-3 N204
 has 
the following properties:22'2 61,66 
• Molecular Weight 
• Relative Vapor Density 
• N204+NO,% 
•	 Boiling Point (14.7 psia), °F 
• Freezing Point, °F 
• Vapor Pressure (70 °F), psia 
• Specific Gravity (77 °F) 
•	 Ignition Capability 
• Odor 
• Odor Threshold, ppm 
• Exposure limit, ppm 
• Density (77 °F & 14.7 psia), Ibm/gal 










1 to 3 
1.0 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing). 
11 .96 {Density [Ibm/ft3] = 95.499 - 0.07804 * (T rF]) + 0.00072 * (P [psig])} 
Currently, monopropellant grade hydrazine (N 2 H4) is the fuel used in the Auxiliary Power Units 
(APU) on the Space Shuttle orbiters and the Hydraulic Power Units (HPU) on the Space Shuttle Solid 
Rocket Boosters (SRB5). N 2H4 is also used on many spacecraft for monopropellant rocket propulsion (on 
the order of single digits to hundreds of pounds of thrust per rocket engine). To produce thrust, 
monopropellant rockets utilize a metal-based agent to catalytically decompose the N 2H4 into ammonia,
nitrogen, and hydrogen. Liquid hydrazine contains about 98.5% pure N2 H4 with the remaining 1.5% being 
primarily water. Aerozine 50 (along with N204) was used for the first and second stages of the Titan II 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Titan space launch vehicles including the 23G (a variant of 
the Titan II used for launching medium-sized spacecraft), IIIB, IIIC, and IV. The Titan II, lllB, IIIC, and IV 
rockets used the largest quantities of hypergolic propellants per launch in the history of the United States 
rocket fleet (for the first stage approximately 13,000 gallons of N 204
 and 11,000 gallons of A-50 was used 
along with 3,100 gallons of N 204
 and 1,700 gallons of A-50 for the second stage). 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) classifies N 2H4
 and its derivatives as 
a possible carcinogen. 66 N2H4 and its derivatives are extremely toxic, highly flammable, and highly 
corrosive. "Hydrazines and their vapors explode on contact with strong oxidizers, such as N2O4, 
hydrogen peroxide, fluorine, and halogen fluorides. Additionally, they react on contact with metallic 
oxides, such as iron, copper, lead, manganese, and molybdenum to produce fire or explosion."29 
Hydrazine fires produce little to no smoke or colorful flames. N2H4 has a tendency to react 
exothermically with or without an oxidizer present (the reaction increases the temperature thus increasing 
the reaction rate; this is also known as a thermal runaway reaction). Another way to describe a hydrazine 
thermal runaway reaction is "...the rate of heat generation by the reaction exceeds the rate of heat 
removal from the system." 8
 This process is directly related to the auto-ignition temperature, which 
decreases as pressure increases. The exothermic reaction can end in an explosion if one or more of the 
following conditions are met within the system containing the hydrazine: the reacting system is confined 
to a rigid volume; the reacting system is adiabatic or nearly adiabatic; the reaction rate increases with 
temperature; or if the hydrazine is subjected to rapid over-pressurization through "water hammer".21 
The vapor densities of all hydrazines are greater than air. Hydrazine evaporates at approximately 
the same rate as water at room temperature. N 2 H4
 liquid at room temperature and pressure is clear and 
oily. N2 H4
 and MMH are hygroscopic (they readily absorbs water); therefore, water is widely used as a 
diluting agent. A liquid mixture of 58% water and 42% hydrazine or MMH by weight prevents ignition in 
an open air environment. A vapor mixture of 65% water and 35% hydrazine or MMH is considered 
nonflammable in air. 2° The following are properties of N2H4:2061'66 
• Molecular Weight 
•	 Boiling Point (14.7 psia), °F 
• Freezing Point, °F 
• Vapor Pressure (77 °F), psia 
•	 Ignition Capability 
• Auto-ignites, °F 
• Ratio of Specific Heat (gas) 
• Odor 
• Odor Threshold, ppm 
• Exposure Limit, ppm 





4.7 to 100% by volume in air 
437 in air, 984 in GN 2, (increases with decreasing pressure) 
1.19 
Ammonia; fishy 
2 to 3 
0.01 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing) 
8.38 
PROPERTIES OF MONOMETHYLHYDRAZINE (MMH) 
Monomethylhydrazine is the fuel used in the OMS/RCS on the Space Shuttle orbiters. 
Monomethyl-hydrazine, N2H3(CH3), is similar to hydrazine, N2 H4 , with the exception that it contains a 
methyl group in its molecule in place of one hydrogen atom. Most rocket grade MMH contains 98% pure 
N2H3(CH3) with the remaining 2% being primarily water. MMH is not used for monopropellant rocket 
propulsion because the carbon formed in its decomposition contaminates the catalyst. It is extremely 
toxic, highly flammable, and highly corrosive. MMH has greater compatibility with metals as compared to 
N204.
MMH may have a slight yellow-orange tinted flame. MMH can also react exothermicaIl' with or 
without an oxidizer present, but the reaction rate has been found to be much slower than N2H4 . MMH
vapor has also been found to be much less sensitive to detonation as compared to N 2 H4. 8 As a result of 
differences in comparison to N2H4, MMH has slightly different properties as shown below:21' 
• Molecular Weight 
•	 Boiling Point (14.7 psia), °F 
• Freezing Point, °F 
• Vapor Pressure (77 °F), psia 
•	 Ignition Capability 
•	 Auto-ignites in air, °F 
• Ratio of Specific Heat (gas) 
• Odor 
• Odor Threshold, ppm 
• Exposure Limit, ppm 





2.5 to 98% by volume in air 
286 to 386 (increases with decreasing pressure) 
1.13 
Amine; fishy 
1 to 3 
0.01 (exposure limit for NASA hardware processing) 
7.27 {Density [Ibm/ft3] = 56.926 - 0.03231 * (T rF]) + 0.000252 * (P [psig])) 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A total of 45 hypergolic related incidents were studied for the purpose of compiling common 
lessons learned. Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the fuel and oxidizer incidents. As shown in Table 1, 
the ratio of fuel to oxidizer incidents is approximately one-to-one. Also, the severity (personnel injury or 
the extent of the hardware damage) was approximately the same when comparing fuel and oxidizer 
incidents. One key difference between a fuel and an oxidizer incident was that a fuel incident has the 
potential to become very dangerous quite abruptly as compared to an oxidizer incident as a result of the 
potential for fire or explosion. The graphs in Figure 1 illustrate that many of the incidents were directly 
related to some sort of human error along with the occurrence of the event usually taking place during 
some sort of transfer of commodity or opening of a system. 
Table 1: Hypergol Spill and Fire Summary
Distribution of Root Causes	 Disthbution of lime of Incident 
7; 
•	 Procedure Adherence/Control 
•	 Improper Training 
o	 Human Error (Operations) 
o Improper GSENehicle Design
13	 i8 
• During Commodity Movement 
• During R&R 
o	 During Hypergol Operation 
0 During Opened System 
•	 Improper Config. Management	 •	 During Static Configuration 
Figure 1: Distributions for Root Cause and Time of Incidents 
Some common lessons learned deduced from the various root causes of the studied incidents 
are shown in the following list. If these items were properly addressed prior to the incidents, prevention 
may have been possible (in hindsight) or the impact or consequence of the incident could have been 
reduced. 
• Improper configuration control and internal or external human performance shaping factors can 
lead to being falsely comfortable with a system 
o Vent systems are often neglected and treated as non-hazardous even though they can 
capture and contain hypergolic liquids (especially in low points) 
o Aging support hardware should be routinely inspected to reduce the risk of a failure 
during critical operations 
• Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur or hardware is 
damaged 
• Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure 
o Low points in ground support equipment (GSE) should be designed out 
• Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger 
o Inadequate knowledge of electrostatic discharge while working fuel operations can lead 
to a fire or explosion 
o Knowledge of transducer offsets is very important for system oversight 
o Unknown incompatibilities (from lack of training or research) with propellants can cause 
surprising failures 
o If an incident does occur, the system should immediately be placed into a stable 
configuration; following this, the procedure should be stopped to assess the problem and 
its possible ramifications 
o A heightened amount of situational awareness of technicians and engineers working 
operations can reduce the risk of an incident and decrease the possibility of injuries or 
damage if an incident does occur 
• Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in 
unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs
lmproper.procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental 
and quickly lead to an incident 
o Improper emergency procedures can increase the risk of injuries or hardware damage 
Improper local cleanliness or housekeeping (for example iron oxide or rust) can result in fires or 
explosions 
A thorough hypergol system evacuation should be completed (wherever a vacuum is tolerable by 
the system) prior to the removal or disconnection of any hypergolic propellant fittings 
o A pulse purge has proven to be inadequate for the removal of residual propellants 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Some type of human error can be traced to nearly every incident studied as a root cause, 
whether it be an error in the design phase or an error prior to or during operational use of hardware 
containing hypergols. Humans are most definitely not perfect and even when the most knowledgeable 
personnel are intimately involved in the design phase (vehicle or GSE) or during an operation, mistakes 
can be made and critical items can be overlooked. One can deduce, however, that most incidents 
happen during some sort of dynamic operation. Hypergols tend to be very stable in a static configuration 
(as long as the compatibility characteristics have been well addressed). 
Advance warning (prior to any liquid or vapor release) was available in several of the incidents to 
the technicians in the vicinity of the spill and/or the engineers that were monitoring from a remote location. 
The warning indications include off-nominal data (remote or local), off-nominal system characteristics, 
and/or local changes that occurred without human intervention. Some of these went unnoticed or were 
ignored during the operation, thus resulting in an incident. There was advance warning in 19 out of 38 
total incidents (50% of the time). This percentage does not include spilled fuel as an advance warning of 
a fire (5 occurrences). Depending on the local environment, there is a reasonable probability that if 
hydrazine (or one of its derivatives) is spilled, there will be a fire; therefore, the fuel spill itself is an 
advance warning of a fuel fire. Roughly 42% of the documented fuel fires studied resulted in a fire or 
explosion. The Titan IV K-9 N 204
 spill likely had an advance warning; however, there was no one in the 
vicinity of the indications to receive the warning, therefore, this was not included in the above percentage 
along with the OV-1 01 APU spill in 1977, since it was unable to be determined if there was an advanced 
warning for this incident. 
Hypergolic rocket propellants have proven to be a highly reliable asset in manned and unmanned 
spaceflight; however, their maintenance on the ground has proven to be relatively difficult. Do the 
operational risks from possible human errors or hardware failures causing a catastrophic incident 
outweigh the usefulness of hypergols even though they have been used for the last 50 years of manned 
and unmanned spaceflight? One would have to say probably not, since hypergols are so widely used in 
the space industry currently and are being proposed to be used on many vehicles in the future. 
Therefore, ground operations on hypergol systems have become increasingly scrutinized for possible 
unknowns, and righifully so. The data shown in this report are not an example of why we should not be 
using hypergolic propellants on spacecraft and launch vehicles, but rather what we can and should do to 
mitigate possible unforeseen ground operation and/or design problems. 
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